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ABSTRACT. In this paper, we shall discuss about the explicit derivation of the mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium for some $n(\geq 3)$ player competitive silent games of timing.
We extend some former results for 2-player games in the area to the $n$-player games.
We deal with (a) shooting contest, (b) competitive prediction of a random variable
and (c) war-games of attrition (or animals‘ display). We find that $3- \mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}\varpi$ game in
(b) is very difficult to derive the explicit solution.
$0$ Introduction. First we shall explain the two features in the games in this paper by
taking the case of shooting contest.
(1) Each player in the game of timing has to decide his time to shoot under the condition
that he is not informed of the shooting times of his rivals. That is, we deal with silent
games of timing.
(2) Shooting by more than one player at the same time is quite udikely event. So, payoffs
in this event should not effect on the player’s behavior. We deal with $n \frac{-}{}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ games
where players in the draw are not rewarded, $i.e.$ , the $\mathrm{s}o1\mathrm{e}$ player is the winner.
We deal with the shooting contest in Section 1, competitive prediction of a random
variable in Section 2, and war-games of attrition in Sections 3 and 4. Three remarks are
given in Section 5.
1 Silent Contest where Sole and the Earliest Hitter Wins. Consider an n-player
silent contest with the same accuracy function. Each player has one silent bullet which
may be fired at any time in $[0,1]$ aiming his target. He, starting at time $t=0$, walks
toward his target at a distance 1 apart at a constant unit speed, with no opportunity to
stop nor retreat. Let $A(t)$ (called accuracy function) be the probability for each player of
hitting his target, if he fires at time $t\in[0,1]$ . $A(t)$ is assumed to be differentiable with
$A’(t)>0,A(\mathrm{O})=0$ and $A(1)=1$ .
Payoff to each player is 1, if he hits his target at the earliest time among the other
players who hit, and $0$ , if otherwise. Players who play draw ( $i.e.$ , hit by firing at the same
time), get $0$ . Each player has to find the firing strategy under which his expected payoff is
maximized.
The symmetric nature of the game suggests that we shall confine ourselves here to n-ply
symmetric equilibria. Intuitively, the fact that players have no knowledge of each other’s
actions suggests randomization, and by symmetry, any mixed strategy that is optimal for
one player is also optimal for the others, and the equilibrium payoffs of the game to the
players are identical. Hence a reasonable guess of the equilibrium strategy (abbr. by EQS)
for each player has the form of a p.d.f. $f(t),a\leq t\leq 1$ , for some $a\in[0,1]$ . Thus, the
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expected payoff to player 1, if he fires at time $x$ , and all $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}_{}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ players employ their EQS is
given by
(1.1) $M_{1}(x,f,\cdot\cdot, f)\wedge n-.1=\{$
$A(x)$ , if $0\leq x<a$ ,
$A(x)[1- \int_{a}^{x}A(t)f(t)dt]^{n-1}$ , if $a\leq x\leq 1$
since, for $a\leq x\leq 1$ , player 1 can get reward 1, only in the case where all players $2\sim n$ do
not fire, or fire with no-hitting before time $x$ .
Let $v$ be the common EQ payoff (EQ means equilibrium). Then the condition of EQ is
(1.2) $M_{1}(x, f, \cdots,f)v$ , for
For $a\leq x\leq 1$ , we obtain, by differentiating (1.1) and equating $0$ , the differential
equation
(1.3) $\frac{f’(x)}{f(x)}=-\frac{2n-1}{n-1}[\frac{A’(x)}{A(x)}-\frac{A’’(x)}{A’(x)}]$ .
Integration from $a$ to $x$ gives
(1.4) $\frac{f(x)}{f(a)}=\frac{A’(x)}{A’(a)}(\frac{A(x)}{A(a)})^{-_{n-}^{2n-1}}\neg$ ,
that is,
(1.5) $f(x)=c(A(x))^{-\frac{2n- 1}{n-1}}A^{j}(x)$ .
The condition $\int_{a}^{1}f(t)dt=1$ gives
(1.6) $c^{-1}= \int_{a}^{1}(A(x))^{-\frac{2n-1}{n-1}}A’(x)dx=(\frac{n-1}{n})[(A(a))^{-_{n}n}\neg--1]$ .
The condition (1.2), for $a\leq x\leq 1$ , requires that
$A(x)[1- \int_{a}^{x}A(t)f(t)dt]^{n-1}\equiv v$,
which becomes $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}(1.5)$ , after simplified,
(1.7) $c(n-1)[(A(a))^{-_{\mathfrak{n}}1}\neg--(A(x))^{-_{n}\underline{\iota}}\neg]=1-v^{\frac{1}{n-1}}(A(x))^{-_{n}1}\neg-$ , $\forall x\in[a, 1]$ .
Eliminating $c$ , by using (1.6) and (1.7), we obtain
(1.8) $(A(a))^{-\frac{1}{1-1}}’-(A(x))^{-\frac{1}{n-1}}$
$= \frac{1}{n}[1-(\frac{v}{A(x)})^{\frac{1}{n-1}}][(A(a))^{-\frac{n}{n-1}}-1]$ , $\forall x\in(a, 1)$ .
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Therefore we must have
(1.9) $(A(a))^{-_{n}n}\neg--n(A(a))^{-\frac{1}{n-1}}-1=0$ and $v^{\frac{1}{n-1}}[(A(a))^{-\neg}n’-‘-1]=n$
The two equations above give $v^{-\frac{1}{n-1}}=(A(a))^{-\neg^{1}}n-$ and hence $v=A(a)$ . Also the first
one is, by multiplying $(A(a))^{\frac{n}{n-1}}$ on both sides, is identical to
(1.10) $(A(a))^{n-}\neg^{n}+nA(a)-1=0$ .
Now, in the final step, we have to confrm the condition $M_{1}(x, f, \cdots, f)\leq v,$ $\forall x\in[0,a]$ ,
in Eq.(1.2) is satisfied. This holds true since $A(x)\leq A(a)=v,$ $\forall x\in[0,a)$ .
All of the above arguments combined lead to $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ result.
Theorem 1 Let $\alpha_{n}$ be a unique root in $[0,1]$ of the equati,$on$
(1.11) $\alpha^{\frac{n}{n-1}}+n\alpha-1=0$.
Then the common EQS for each player is
(1.12) $f^{*}(x)= \frac{1}{n-1}(\alpha_{n})^{\frac{1}{n-1}}(A(x))^{-\frac{2n-1}{n-1}}A’(x)$ , for $A^{-1}(\alpha_{n})=a_{n}\leq x\leq 1$
The common EQV of the game is equal to $\alpha_{n}$ .
We find that (1) the common EQV of the game is independent of the accuracy function
$A(t)$ , and (2) the starting point of the support of the optimal p.d.f. depends on $A(t)$ .
Further more, we observe from (1.11), that the probability of draw ( $i.e.$ , all players get
zero) is equal to $(\alpha_{n})^{n-}\neg^{n}$ .
Computed values of $\alpha_{n}$ , $2\leq n\leq 50$ are given in Ref. [2: Table 3]. For example,
$\alpha_{n}$ $=$ $\sqrt{2}-1$ su 0.4142, for $n=2$
su 0.2831,0.2173,0.1770, for $n=3,4,5$ , resp..
Example 1. Let $A(x)=x^{\gamma},\gamma>0$ . Then $a_{n}=A^{-1}(\alpha_{n})=\alpha_{n}^{1/\gamma}$ and
$f^{*}(x)= \frac{\gamma}{n-1}(\alpha_{n})^{\neg^{1}}n-x^{-(\frac{n}{n-1}\mathrm{Y}+1)}$, for $\alpha_{n}^{1/\gamma}\leq x\leq 1$ .
For any fixed $n\geq 2,$ $a_{n}$ decreases as 7 increases. Due to the competitive nature of the
game, players’ $a_{n}$ is snall(large), if his shooting skill is low(high).
Example 2. Let $A(x)= \frac{e^{x}-1}{e-1}$ . Then $a_{n}=A^{-1}(\alpha_{n})=\log\{1+(e-1\rangle\alpha_{n}\}$ and so, $a_{n}$
decreases as $n$ increases. For example, we have
$a_{n}$ $=$ $\log\{(\sqrt{2}-1)(e+\sqrt{2})\}\approx$ 0.5375, for $n=2$
$\approx$ 0.3964, 0.3173, 0.2655, for $n=3,4,5$, resp..
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Moreover
$f^{*}(x)= \frac{1}{n-1}(\alpha_{n})^{n}\neg\underline{\iota}(e-1)^{-1}(e^{x}-1)^{-\frac{2n-1}{n-1}}e^{x}$ , for $a_{n}\leq x\leq 1$ .
2 N-player Competitive Prediction of a Ramdom Variable. $N$ players com ete$\mathrm{p}$in predicting the realized value $u$ of a $\mathrm{r}.\mathrm{v}$ . $U$ which obeys $U_{[0,1]}(i.e.$ , uniform distribution in
$[0,1])$ . The sole player who has predict$e\mathrm{d}$ the value not greater than $u$ and nearest to $u$ ets$\mathrm{g}$1, and the other $n-1$ players get $0$ . Each player aims to maximize the expected reward hecan get.
A reasonable guess of the EQS for each player has the form of a p.d.f. $g(x),$ $0\leq x\leq a$ ,
for some $a\in(0,1)$ . Let $G(x)=I(x<a) \int_{0}^{x}g(t)dt+I(x\geq a)$ . Then the expected rewardto player 1, if he predicts $x$ , and the other players employ their EQS is
(2.1) $M_{1}(x,g,\cdot\cdot,g)\wedge n-.1=\overline{x}$, for $a<x<1$ .
For $0<x<a$ , it is
(2.2) $M_{1}(x,g, \ldots,g)=(G(x))^{n-1}\overline{x}$
$+ \sum_{k=1}^{n}k(G(x))^{\iota-1-k}’\int_{x}^{a}g(t)(\overline{G}(t))^{k-1}(t-x)dt$ .
since $k$ players $(1 \leq k\leq n-1)$ may predict greater than $x$ and the other $n-1-k$ players
predict less than $x$ . Note that p.d.f. of $\max(X_{1}, \cdots,X_{k})$ is $k(\overline{G}(t))^{k-1}g(t)$ .
Since we have, by $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}_{\Psi}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ by parts,
$\int_{x}^{a}(t-x)(\overline{G}(t))^{k-1}g(t)dt=\frac{1}{k}\int_{x}^{a}(\overline{G}(t\rangle)^{k}dt$ ,
we can rewrite (2.2) as
(2.3) $M_{1}(x,g, \cdots,g)=\wedge n-1(G(x))^{n-1}\overline{x}+\sum_{k=1}^{n}(G(x))^{n\cdot-1-k}\int_{x}^{a}(\overline{G}(t))^{k}dt$,
for $0<x<a$ . Let $v$ be the common EQV of the game. The condition of EQ is
(24) $M_{1}(x,g, \cdots,g)v$, for
Rom $(2.3)-(2.4)$ , we compute $ae^{M_{1}(x,g,\cdots,g)}\partial=0$, for $0\leq x<a$ . After dividing both
sides by $(G(x))^{n-1}$ , and simplifying, we get finally
(2.5) $1+ \sum_{k=1}^{n-1}(\frac{\overline{G}(x)}{G(x)})^{k}=\frac{g(x)}{G(x)}[(n-1)\overline{x}$
$+ \sum_{k=1}^{n-1}(n-1-k)\int_{x}^{a}(\frac{\overline{G}(t)}{G(x)})^{k}dt]$ .
This equation becomes very quickly unmanageable. We show the solutions for $n=2$
and 3 only.
For $n=2,$ $(2.5)$ becomes $\overline{x}g(x)=1,0\leq x<a$ , and therefore, we obtain
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$g^{*}(x)= \frac{1}{\overline{x}}$ and $G$“ $(x)=-\log\overline{x}$ , for $0\leq x\leq a=1-e^{-1}(\approx 0.63212)$ .
The other requirement in (2.4) is satisfied, since by (2.1),
$M_{1}(x,g^{*})=\overline{x}\leq\overline{a}=e^{-1}$ , for $a\leq x\leq 1$
and
$M_{1}(a,g^{*})=\overline{a}G^{*}(a\rangle=-\overline{a}\log\overline{a}=e^{-1}$.
So, the common EQV of the game is $e^{-1}(\approx 0.36788)$ .
The above result is alrealy known, for example, by Ref.[1 ; p.120, and 3].
For the case $ll=3$, we obtain the result below.
Proposition 2 The 3-player “prediction game “, here, the common EQS $g^{*}(x)$ , if it exists,
satisfies a simple but non-separable differential equation
(2.6) $g’(x)=2(g(x))^{2}(1-\overline{x}g(x))$ , $0<x<a,$ urith $g(a)= \frac{1}{2\overline{a}}$ .
The common EQV is $\overline{a}$, where $a$ is a unique root in $(0,1)$ of the equation
(2.7) $\frac{1}{2}\int_{0}^{a}(\overline{G}(t))^{2}dt=\overline{a}$ .
Proof. Eq.(2.2), for $n=3$, becomes
(2.8) $M_{1}(x,g,g)=(G(x))^{2} \overline{x}+2G(x)\int_{x}^{a}(t-x)g(t)dt+2\int_{x}^{a}(t-x)\overline{G}(t)g(t)dt$
which gives
(2.9) $M_{1}(0,g,g)= \frac{1}{2}\int_{0}^{a}(\overline{G}(t))^{2}dt$ and $M_{1}(a,g,g)=\overline{a}$ .
Eq.(2.5), for $n=3$, becomes after simplification,
(2.10) $G(x)-x+ \int_{x}^{a}tg(t)dt=\frac{1}{2g(x)}$ .
Differentiating both sides, we get a simple but non-separable differential equation (2.6).
An approach to (2.6) is to consider a transformation
(2.11) $s(x)=[G(x)-x+ \int_{x}^{a}tg(t)dt]/\overline{x}$.
This function is positive and increasing for $0<x<a$ , by $(2.9)\sim(2.11)$ , with values
$\int_{0}^{a}tg(t)dt$ , at $x=0$, and 1 at $x=a$.
Differentiating both sides and using (2.10), we obtain a simple and separable equation
(2.12) $\frac{ss’}{s^{2}-s+_{2}1}=\frac{1}{\overline{x}}$ , $0<x<a$ , with $s(a)=1$ .
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Integral both sides $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}x$ to $a$ , and we arrive at
(2.13) $(s^{2}-s+ \frac{1}{2})^{1}\mathrm{z}e^{\tan^{-1}(2s-1)}=(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}e^{\pi/4})\overline{a}/\overline{x}$,
which is too complicate to obtain $s(x)$ explicity.
If $s(x)$ and hence $g(x)=s’(x)+\overline{s}(x)/\overline{x}$ are determined, then $a$ is determined by (2.9)
as a unique root of the equation (2.7). Then, from (2.1), the common EQV of the game is
$\overline{a}$ . $\square$
We remark that Eq.(2.6) has a particular solution $g(x)=k/\overline{x}$, where $k$ satisfies $k \overline{k}=\frac{1}{2}$ ,
$i.e.,$ $k=_{\mathfrak{T}}1(1\pm\cap-1$ .
This fact, however, seems useless to derive the explicit solution.
See Remark 2 in Section 5.
3 Games of War of Attrition. We discuss, in this section, about an $n_{r}$-player game
close to the animals’ competition game first considered by Maynard Smith (see Ref.[5]).
It consists of displays by animals in which victory goes to the sole animal which displays
longest. The sole winner gets the prize $V(>0)$ and pays cost equal to the length of the time
until the second longest displayer leaves the contest. Animals who play draw are considered
as losers. The losers get $0$ and pay cost equal to the length of their displaying time.
Let $x_{\dot{*}}\in[0,\infty),i=1,$ $\cdots$ , $n$ , be the pure strategy of player $i$ , to mean that he stops his
display at tine $x_{i}$ . Payoffs for the players are given as
(3.1) $M_{i}(x_{1},x_{2}, \cdots,x_{n})=\{$





The situation of the game here is a silent game. Players do not know at what time the
rivals leave the contest. So, in the real world of animals, the situation may be unsuitable
except the case for $n=2$ or 3. Rather, it is suitable for the Sealed-Bid-Auction with the
rule under which the winner pays the second winner’s bid. Also, see Remark 3 in Section 5.
The expected reward for player 1, if he bids $x\in[0,\infty)$ , and all if his rivals employ their
common mixed strategy $h(t)$ , is given by
(3.2) $M_{1}(x, h, \cdots, h)=\int_{0}^{x}(V-t)d(H(t))^{n-1}-x\{1-(H(x))^{n-1}\},0<x<\infty$,




(3.4) $M_{1}(x, h, \cdots, h)=-\int_{0}^{x}(V-t)K’(t)dt-xK(x)$ .




Substituting $K(x)$ into (3.4), we have
$M_{1}(x, h, \cdots, h)=\frac{1}{V}\int_{0}^{x}(V-t)e^{-t/V}dt-xe^{-x/V}$ .
The first term in the r.h.s. is equal to
$V \int_{0}^{x/V}(1-u)e^{-u}du=V[ue^{-u}]_{0}^{x/V}=xe^{-x/V}$ ,
and therefore $M_{1}(x, h, \cdots,h)\equiv 0,$ $\forall x\in[0,\infty)$ .
Theorem 3 For the $n$-player silent game, considered in this section, the common EQS $\dot{l}S$
given by
$H^{*}(x)= \int_{0}^{x}h^{*}(t)dt=(1-e^{-x/V})^{\frac{1}{\iota-1}}’$ , $0\leq x<\infty$
and the common EQV is $0$ .
The result for $n=2$ is the known result, for example Ref.[1 ; pp.119\sim 120]. The EQV is
zero for all $n\geq 2$ , and any $V>0$ .
4 Games of War of Attrition –Continued. Another version of war-of-attrition
game is the case where the contest ends at time 1. The prize given to the sole winner, if
he stops at time $x\in[0,1]$ is $V(x)$ , which is positive and decreasing for $0\leq x\leq 1$ , with
$0\leq V(1)\leq 1$ and $V$ ‘ $(x)<0,$ $\forall x\in(\mathrm{O}, 1)$ . The pure strategies and payoffs are the same as
in (3.1), expect that the pure strategy space is changed from $[0,\infty)$ to $[0,1]$ .
$I(a \leq x\leq 1).\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}e\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{p}1\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}1,\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{S}X\in[)}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{p}1\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{s}’ \mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{Q}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\iota\cdot \mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}H(x)=I(0_{01]\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}}\leq x<a)\int_{\mathrm{a}11}\mathrm{o}_{\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{k}}^{x}h(t)dt+$




$\int_{0}^{x}(V(x)-t)d(H(t))^{n-1}-x\{1-(H(x))^{n-1}\}$ , if $0\leq x<a$ ,
$\int_{0}^{a}(V(x)-t)d(H(,t))^{n-1}$ , if $a<x\leq 1$ .
where $t$ is the “second winner”s stopping time. Let
(4.2) $Q(x)=V(x)(H(x))^{n-1}$ , for $0<x<a$ .
Then (4.1) becomes, for $0<x<a$ ,
(4.3) $M_{1}(x, h, \cdots, h)$ $=$ $Q(x)- \int_{0}^{x}td(H(t))^{n-1}-x\{1-\frac{Q(x)}{V(x)}\}$
$Q(x)+ \int_{0}^{x}\frac{Q(t)}{V(t)}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{l}-x$ .
Then $\underline{\partial}M\not\in=0$ gives a linear differential equation
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(4.4) $Q’(x)+ \frac{Q(x)}{V(x)}=1$ , with $Q(\mathrm{O})=0$
and the solution is
(4.5) $Q(x)=e^{-\int(V(x))^{-1}dx}[ \int e^{\int(V(x))^{-1}dx}dx+c]$
where $c$ is an arbitration constant.
For one of the easiest example, let $V(x)=\overline{x},0\leq x\leq 1$ . Then we have
$Q(x)= \overline{x}[\int_{0}^{x}dt/\overline{t}+c]=\overline{x}(-\log\overline{x}+c)$ .
By the boundary condition $Q(\mathrm{O})=0$ we have $c=0$, and so,
(4.6) $Q(x)=-\overline{x}\log\overline{x}$ ,
which gives from (4.2)
(4.7) $H(x)=(-\log\overline{x})^{\frac{1}{n-1}}$ , $0\leq x\leq a$ ,
an increasing function with $H(0)=0$ and $H(a)=(-\log\overline{a})^{\frac{1}{n-1}}$ .
The condition $H(a)=1$ gives $a=1-e^{-1}\approx 0.63212$ .
For $H(x)$ , given by (4.6), payoff $(4.1)-(4.3)$ for player 1becomes, for $0<x<a$,
$M_{1}(x, h, \cdots, h)=-\overline{x}\log\overline{x}+\int_{0}^{x}(-\log^{\neg}t)dt-x=0$ ,
since the second term in the $\mathrm{r}.\mathrm{h}.\mathrm{s}$. is equal to $\overline{x}\log_{\overline{X}}+x,$ by using $\int(1+\log\overline{t})dt=-\overline{t}\log\overline{t}$ .
For $a<x\leq 1,$ $M_{1}(x,h, \cdots, h)$ is a decreasing function of $x$ , by (4.1).
Hence, if $H^{*}(x)$ is chosen as defined by (4.7), then
$M_{1}(h, h^{*}, \cdots, h^{*})\leq M_{1}(h^{*},h^{*}, \cdots, h^{*})=0$, $\forall \mathrm{p}.\mathrm{d}.\mathrm{f}$ . $h(x)$ .
Thus we arrive at
$\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}\infty \mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}4$ For the $n$-player silent game, we discuss in this section, utth $V(x)=\overline{x}$ , the
common EQS $is$
$H^{*}(x)=I(0\leq x<a)(-\log\overline{x})^{arrow}n-+I(a<x\leq 1)$ ,
and the common EQV is $0$ , where $a=1-e^{-1}(\approx 0.63212)$ .
The prize and cost are in balance in the EQ.
The solution is the same as one for 2-player competitive prediction for the uniform
distributed $\mathrm{r}.\mathrm{v}$.(see Section 2).
More generally we have
Theorem $4’$ For $V(x)= \frac{1}{k}\overline{x,},$ $(0<k\leq 1)$ , the common EQS $i.s$
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$H^{*}(x)=[(k/\overline{k})\{(\overline{x})^{k-1}-1\}]^{\frac{1}{\iota-1}}’$ , $0\leq x<a$ ,
where $a$ is a unique root in $(0,1)$ of the equation
$-\overline{k}\log\overline{a}=-\log k$.
The common EQV is $0$ .
Note that $\lim_{karrow 1-0}\frac{(\overline{x})^{k-1}-1}{k}=-\log\overline{x}$ and hence $\lim_{karrow 1-0}H^{*}(x)=(-\log\overline{x})^{\frac{\mathrm{I}}{n-1}}$ .
Also see Remark 3 in Section 5.
5 Three Remarks.
Remark 2 Consider the -player “guess game”, instead of 3-player “prediction game” of
the Section 2. Because of the symmetric nature of the game, a reasonable guess of the EQS
has the form of
$G(x)=I( \overline{a}<x<a)\int_{\overline{a}}^{x}g(t)dt+I(a\leq x\leq 1)$ ,
for some $a \in[\frac{1}{2},1]$ . The role player who has guessed the value nearest to the realized
value $u\sim U_{[0,1]}$ gets 1, and the other two players get $0$ . Each player aims to maximize
the expected reward he can get. The expected reward for player 1, if he guesses $x$ , and his
rivals employ their EQS is, instead of (2.8),
(5.1) $M_{1}(x,g,g)=2 \int_{\overline{a}}^{x}(1-\frac{x+t}{2})g(t)G(t)dt$
$+2 \int_{\overline{a}<t_{1}<x}\int_{<t_{2}<a}\frac{t_{2}-t_{1}}{2}g(t_{1})g(t_{2})dt_{1}dt_{2}+2\int_{x}^{a}\frac{x+t}{2}g(t)\overline{G}(t)dt$ for $\overline{a}<x<a$ .
The solution to this game is $\mathrm{s}\iota \mathrm{u}\cdot \mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{z}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{y}$ simple. A. Shaked (Ref.[4]) showed that the
common EQS is
(52) $g^{*}(t)=2$ , for $\frac{1}{4}<t<\frac{3}{4}$ .
by using the fact that it should be symmetric $(i.e., g(x)=g(\overline{x}),\forall x\in[0,1])$ .
The three terms in the r.h.s. of (5.1) at $x= \frac{1}{4}$ are equal to $0,0$, and 51, resp., in this
order, and the common EQV is \S 1.
It is interesting to prove that there is no mixed-strategy EQ in -player guess game.
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